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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 1994, the Clinton Administration announced its policy
to allow American companies to sell remote sensing imagery to the
public and foreign entities.1 The Clinton policy is but one of the legal
instruments governing the sale and preparation of remote sensing
imagery. It attempts to modernize the United States regulatory scheme
to allow United States companies to compete effectively in an
increasingly competitive market.2  The policy goals are especially
significant because growth in the technological development of remote
sensing imagery has outpaced the policies and regulations governing it.
The United States has been attempting, since the 1970s, to create a
legal framework, domestically and internationally, that provides the
private sector with a stable and comprehensive regulatory scheme.
With such a scheme in place, the private sector will have the incentive
and support necessary to justify the substantial expenses and risks
associated with private space ventures.3
1. U.S. Deputy Secretary of Commerce David J. Barram Announces Administration's New
Policy on Remote Sensing Space Capabilities, U.S. DEP'T COM. NEWS (Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce), Mar. 10, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Policy Release] (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
2. See U.S. Policy on Foreign Access to Remote Sensing Space Capabilities: Fact Sheet, U.S.
DEP'T COM. NEWS (Office of the Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Commerce), Mar. 10, 1994, at 1
[hereinafter Fact Sheet] (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
3. See POLICY AND LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE:
STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32-41 (1983); see also Commercial Remote Sensing in the Post-Cold War Era: Joint
Hearing Before the Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology and the Permanent Select Comm. on
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The demand for remote sensing imagery is increasing, and the
projected growth of the market of high-resolution imagery is very
promising.' With the growth of a civilian market for remote sensing
imagery comes national security concerns. In order to alleviate these
concerns, the policies and laws governing remote sensing incorporate
national security safeguards that are intended to protect United States
national security interests by preventing the imagery and technology of
remote sensing from falling into the wrong hands.'
These restrictions, embedded in every legal instrument that relates
to remote sensing, led to a formalized regime that restricts the sale of
remote sensing imagery and fails to provide a clear legal standard for
the manner in which these restrictions will be applied and triggered.
Consequently, legal risk and uncertainty are created, thereby weakening
the competitive position of United States companies. In a highly
competitive market, these restrictions put United States companies at
a disadvantage, and they might be self-defeating and obsolete.
This Comment offers a critique of the national security restric-
tions contained in the United States policy and regulations and the
uncertainty they inject into the commercialization of remote sensing
imagery. After providing a brief technical description of remote
sensing technology and the market realities associated with remote
sensing imagery, this Comment analyzes the legislation and regulations
affecting the private sector's commercialization and dissemination of
remote sensing imagery with a special emphasis on national security
concerns. Specifically, it reviews the Clinton Administration's policy
with regard to the commercialization of remote sensing imagery,
tracing its origins to the international obligations of the United States
and various domestic legislative enactments. In addition, this
Comment analyzes the reasons behind the inclusion of national security
safeguards in the policy and the effects these safeguards have on the
private sector. Further, drawing on lessons from the current export
control regime, this Comment critiques the policy from a legal and
economic viewpoint. Finally, this Comment maps the contours of a
legal definition of "national security," while focusing on the reasons the
policy will impede the progress of the private sector and fail to protect
the interests it was designed to safeguard.
Intelligence, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12 (1994) (testimony of James H. Frey, President, Litton Itek
Optical Systems) [hereinafter Testimony of Frey].
4. See infra section I.C.
5. See Policy Release, supra note 1, at 1.
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II. REMOTE SENSING: SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND,
APPLICATIONS, AND THE MARKET
A. Definition and Technical Background
Remote sensing is "the collection of data which can be processed
into imagery of surface features of the Earth from a .. .satellite." 6
On a more technical level, it means the "sensing of the Earth's surface
from space by making use of ... electromagnetic waves emitted,
reflected or diffracted by the sensed objects."7 It is performed through
the interaction among a light source, such as the sun's reflected light;
the earth's surface; and the atmosphere.' The sensing is actually done
by "sensors on board a satellite which is [sic] usually placed on a low
polar orbit so that it may vertically scan the Earth while the Earth is
revolving around its axis." 9 It can also simply mean satellite photog-
raphy with images taken by advanced photographic equipment and
relayed to a ground station where the digital data is converted into
imagery. "
The technology currently used is quite different from that used in
1972 when the United States launched the first commercially usable
remote sensing satellite, LANDSAT.11 However, the three main
factors to consider when assessing the capabilities of a remote sensing
system remain the same: (1) the type of sensor used, (2) the resolution
6. 15 U.S.C.A. § 5602(5) (West Supp. 1995).
7. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, G.A. Res. 65, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Annex IV I, Agenda Item 72, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/65 (1986) [hereinafter
Principles].
8. Cynthia M. Hayward, Note, Remote Sensing: Terrestrial Laws for Celestial Activities, 8
B.U. INT'L L.J. 157, 162 (1990).
9. Patrick A. Salin, Proprietary Aspects of Commercial Remote-Sensing Imagery, 13 J. INT'L
Bus. 349, 349 (1992). The satellite's orbit is sun-synchronous, which means that the satellite is
constantly interposed between the sun and the earth to ensure that the satellite is always taking
the images during daytime. Robert J. Aamoth, Esq., From Landsat to Mediasat: The Development
of Remote-Sensing Technology and the First Amendment Right of the Press to Use That Technology
for News Reporting, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
SPACE 1, 1-2 & n.2 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq., ed., 1986).
10. See Gary M. Kramer, The First Amendment Viewed from Space: National Security Versus
Freedom of the Press, 14 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 339, 341 (1989); George E. Seay, III,
Comment, Remote Sensing: The Media, the Military, and the National Security Establishment-A
First Amendment Time Bomb, 59 J. AIR L. & COM. 239, 243 (1993).
11. Kramer, supra note 10, at 341. For additional information on LANDSAT, the Land
Remote Sensing Satellite, see infra text accompanying note 45.
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of the images, and (3) the altitude of the orbit. The three principal
types of sensors used are film, electro-optical, and radar. 2
Despite the high quality images provided by the film sensor, it
requires a large, heavy lens that makes it expensive to launch. In
addition, the film has to be retrieved either from the ejected film
capsule or by retrieving the satellite itself.13  Once the satellite runs
out of film, it becomes useless.14 Electro-optical technology, intro-
duced in the early eighties, helped solve many of the problems
associated with the film sensor. The information collected through this
process is assigned a digital value that is transmitted to a ground
station where it is reconstructed."5  The technology allows the
information to be transmitted and reconstructed into high-quality
images at almost real time.'6 Finally, space-based radar systems allow
satellites to capture images in all types of weather by actively emitting
microwave pulses that penetrate clouds, and they work at any hour.'
Remote sensing image quality is determined by its resolution,
which measures the area clearly discernible from a remotely sensed
photograph." The term resolution varies in definition in relation to
the technology used. In other words, resolution in an electro-optical
sensor is different from resolution in a film sensor. 9 In this Com-
ment, resolution corresponds to the size of the smallest discernible
object in the photograph.
The altitude of the orbit is also very important because the lower
the altitude, the better the ground resolution." However, lower orbit
leads to a narrow breadth of vision.2' This important factor distin-
guishes military and reconnaissance oriented satellites from commercial
12. Ann M. Florini, The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging Satellites and U.S. Security,
13:2 INT'L SECURITY 91, 93 (1988).
13. Id. at 93.
14. Id.
15. Id. A grid of many tiny light-sensitive sensors called pixels, each measuring the
electromagnetic radiation from a corresponding area on the ground, form the whole image which
in turn is assigned a digital value and transmitted instantly to the ground station on earth. Id.
See generally Kosta Tsipis, Arms Control Pacts Can Be Verified, DISCOVER, Apr. 1987, at 79, 80-
93.
16. Florini, supra note 12, at 93-94.
17. Id. at 96-97. The problems with space-based radar are that they require a great deal
of energy and are expensive. Id. at 97.
18. Id. at 94. For example, an object as small as 100 meters square can be discerned using
a satellite with a 100-meter resolution, while a 30-meter resolution satellite can resolve an object
as small as 30 meters square. Kramer, supra note 10, at 341.
19. For an excellent explanation of the technical aspects of resolution, see Florini, supra note
12, at 94-96.
20. Id. at 94-95.
21. Id. at 94.
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satellites: narrow vision lowers the commercial value of the image,
makes it unattractive for commercial users, and shortens the life of the
satellite.2
B. Applications and Uses
The origins of remote sensing imagery are rooted in the military
and intelligence establishment.23 Operation Desert Storm demonstrat-
ed the importance of remote sensing imagery on battlefields. 4
However, the use of remote sensing imagery reaches far beyond
military operations and espionage. The potential uses and benefits of
remote sensing imagery are endless, ranging from environmental
monitoring to agriculture, cartography, and land use. 5
Demand for space-based imagery is growing tremendously in light
of its various uses. Bangladesh used remote sensing to recognize the
process of land accretion occurring in the Bay of Bengal, enabling it to
extensively plan the use and development of the new land,26 and
Brazil used the data to map the tributaries of the Amazon River.2
7
The United States and the former Soviet Union used remote sensing
to monitor compliance with arms treaties.28 The French commercial
22. Id. at 110. For instance, LANDSAT has an orbit of 916.6 kilometers. For statistical
data on LANDSAT, see Glossary of Remote Sensing Terminology and Acronyms at
http://www.seaspace.com/glossary.html. Surveillance satellites orbit at an altitude between 200
and 500 kilometers, while civilian satellites orbit at an altitude between 500 and 1,000 kilometers.
Florini, supra note 12, at 94-95.
23. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union designed remote sensing
satellites to collect images of each other's territory. See Florini, supra note 12, at 109-10.
24. William 0. Studeman, The Space Business and National Security; an Evolving
Partnership, AEROSPACE AM., Nov. 1994, at 24; see Craig Covault, Space Recon of Iraq Taxes
CIA Operations, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 3, 1990, at 30. During Desert Storm,
Scud launches were detected by satellite and warnings were relayed to theatre commanders.
Remote sensing systems provided data for mission planning of air and ground forces. See
Testimony May 02, 1995 Dr. Scott Pace RAND Corporation Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces
Military Space Program, Fed. Document Clearing House, May 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
25. MICHAEL HARR & RAJIV KOHLI, COMMERCIAL UTILIZATION OF SPACE: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS 5-6 (1990).
26. Stephen E. Doyle, Remote Sensing by Satellite: Technical and Operational Implications
for International Cooperation, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER
SPACE 3, 8 (Nicholas M. Matte & Hamilton DeSaussure eds., 1976).
27. Jefferson H. Weaver, Lessons in Multilateral Negotiations: Creating a Remote Sensing
Rigime, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 29, 34 (1993).
28. See Mark E. Brender, New Technologies in Newsgathering: Remote Sensing and the First
Amendment, in WIRING THE CONSTITUTION: THE NEW MEDIA IN AN INFORMATION AGE
11, 12 Richard T. Kaplar ed., (1987). For other examples of remote sensing imagery uses, see
Lawrence W. Morley, Remote Sensing Satellites-What Do They Actually Measure and How
Sensitive is the Information, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE
13, 13-18 (Nicholas M. Matte & Hamilton DeSaussure eds., 1976).
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remote sensing system, SPOT (Satelliles Pour l'Observation de la
Terre), provided detailed images of the Chernobyl disaster. SPOT's
imagery also aided in the search for the remains of twenty-eight
passengers unaccounted for in the crash of Pan American Flight 103
over Scotland in 1988,29 and it provided help to Thailand in tracking
and mapping clandestine opium fields.30 Remote sensing imagery
also played a vital role in firefighters' efforts to combat the raging fires
in Yellowstone National Park in the summer of 1988.31 Recently,
images of Muslim prisoners huddled in a military soccer field prior to
their mass executions Serbian military forces were taken by an
American reconnaissance satellite and presented as evidence to the
United Nations Security Council.3 2  Additionally, space-based
imagery has proven to be a very important tool in the hands of the
media.33
C. The Market and Foreign Competition
The decline in defense budgets has created economic incentives
for private industry to enter the high-resolution imagery market.34
While the market for space-based imagery is projected to reach from
$5 to $15 billion by the turn of the century, 3 governments and
private companies interested in entering the market of remote sensing
imagery will have to battle in a fiercely competitive world market.
Systems such as LANDSAT and the French system SPOT have
cornered the market by being, since the seventies, the main sources for
remote sensing imagery for the media and other commercial users.36
29. Hamilton DeSaussure, Remote Sensing Satellite Regulation by National and International
Law, 15 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 351, 352 (1989).
30. See Salin, supra note 9, at 350.
31. Kramer, supra note 10, at 342. For a discussion of the uses of remote sensing, see
Richard J. West, Copyright Protection for Data Obtained by Remote Sensing: How the Data
Enhancement Industry Will Ensure Access for Developing Countries, 11 J. INT'L L. & BUS. 403, 405
(1990).
32. Michael Dobbs & R. Jefferey Smith, Spy Planes Over Bosnia Show More Mass Graves,
SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 29, 1995, at 4.
33. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 342. Satellite imagery was used by American television
networks in 1986 to reveal the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the construction of Libyan missile
sites. Additionally, ABC News used satellite imagery to follow developments in the Iran/Iraq
war. Id. at 342-43.
34. Theresa M. Foley, Zooming in on Remote Sensing Markets, AEROSPACE AM., Oct. 1994,
at 22; see also Testimony of Frey, supra note 3, at 112.
35. For a pessimistic forecast of the market, see John D. Morrocco, Lawmakers Warn
Clinton on Satellite Imagery Sales, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 22, 1993, at 38.
36. See HARR & KOHLI, supra note 25, at 27; see also Kramer, supra note 10, at 340-41.
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Although remote sensing technology was originally developed by
the United States and the former Soviet Union for defense planning
and intelligence gathering, the current market has many players.37
The Russian government is allowing two Russian companies to sell 2-
meter resolution images"s and has set up a center for the sale and
dissemination of commercial satellite data. 9 Additionally, Russian
industrial representatives are planning on marketing 0.75-meter
imagery in the near future, while offering turn-key remote sensing
systems and technological know-how to foreign entities.4" France's
semi-private SPOT is one of the leaders in the sale of space-based
imagery,41 and France is expanding its ventures with the launching of
Helios-lA in July 1995. 4" Helios-lA's technology and 1-meter
resolution imagery are expected to be offered to commercial entities by
the end of the decade.43 Russia and France are not alone in the
market; they are being joined by Japan, China, Korea, Germany, Israel,
Canada, the European Space Agency, and India.44
In the United States, remote sensing imagery is produced by three
sectors. The first is a governmental civil sector known as LANDSAT,
which provides low and moderate resolution imagery for different
purposes.45 LANDSAT is operated by EOSAT (The Earth Observa-
37. Vipin Gupta, New Satellite Images for Sale, 20:1 INT'L SECURITY 94, 94 (1995).
38. Id. at 98.
39. Nagornyy Karabakh, Centre Set Up for Commercial Sale of Satellite Data, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
40. Studeman, supra note 24, at 28; see also Commercial Imagery: Hearing Before the Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1993) (statement of Sam Araki, Executive Vice
President, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.) [hereinafter Statement of Araki].
41. Gupta, supra note 37, at 95, 99-100; see Hugh De Santis, Commercial Observation
Satellites and Their Military Implications: A Speculative Assessment, 12 WASH. Q., Summer 1989,
at 185, 185. SPOT offers imagery with 10 to 20-meter resolution. Gupta, supra note 37, at 95.
42. Vanessa Houlder, A Higher Resolution - The Commercial Uptake of Data from
Observation Satellites Is About to Take Off, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 1995, at 13, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File; see Studeman, supra note 24, at 28.
43. Gupta, supra note 37, at 100 n.8.
44. Prepared Testimony of Keith Calhoun-Senghor, Director, Office of Air & Space
Commercialization, U.S. Department of Commerce Before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology
and Space, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, FED. NEWS
SERVICE, Mar. 1, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File, [hereinafter Testimony
of Calhoun-Senghor]; Roger B. Lindscott, Commercializing Spy-Satellite Technology Should Be a
Boom to Photonics Industry, PHOTONICS SPECTRA, Apr. 1994, at 50; see also HARR & KOHLI,
supra note 25, at 35-63; ISRO Announces Schedule for Three Major Programmes, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
45. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, REMOTE SENSING AND THE
PRIVATE SECTOR: ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION - A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 9, 94 (1984)
[hereinafter TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM]; Hayward, supra note 8, at 166; Kunihiku Tatsuzawa,
Policy and Law in Space Commercialization, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPACE COMMERCIALIZATION
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tion Satellite Company), which is a joint venture between RCA
Corporation and Hughes Aircraft Company under the supervision of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and The
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The
second is a governmental military sector, which provides highly
classified imagery for military and intelligence purposes.46  This
governmental military sector is operated by the Department of Defense
and the Central Intelligence Agency. The third is a non-governmental
commercial sector owned and operated by private companies.
47
Because the United States is one of the largest markets for remote
sensing imagery, several United States companies have undertaken
remote sensing ventures.4" Companies like WorldView Imaging,
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Orbital Sciences, OrbView,
and EarthWatch have been granted licenses to operate remote sensing
systems. 9 These systems are highly advanced and technologically
sophisticated, with resolutions varying between 8 and 1-meter."° The
remainder of this Comment will focus on non-governmental commer-
cial systems and the regulations affecting them.
With so much at risk in commercial space activities, remote
sensing companies are looking for certainty while facing fierce
competition. Their competitiveness and leadership in this vastly
expanding market is determined by their ability to develop highly
innovative technology at an attractive price and operate in a system
where risk is minimized and their rights protected.
III. INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: TREATIES,
PRINCIPLES, AND CUSTOMS
As the exploration of outer space potentials grew, the international
community reacted by promulgating several treaties and principles to
regulate governmental and commercial activities in space. Through the
United Nations' Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS), the international community conceived several major
space treaties and norms. The three most relevant international
instruments pertaining to commercial remote sensing activities are: (1)
II (Kunihiku Tatsuzawa ed., 1992).
46. TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, at 93-94.
47. Id.
48. See HARR & KOHLI, supra note 25, at 58-59.
49. Foley, supra note 34, at 22. From 1994 to 1995, five operators were granted licenses
for the operation of commercial remote sensing systems. Testimony of Calhoun-Senghor, supra
note 44.
50. See Gupta, supra note 37, at 104-05.
1996]
Seattle University Law Review
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (known as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967);"' (2) the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects (known as the Liability Convention);12 and (3) the United
Nations' General Assembly resolution adopting the Principles Relating
to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (known as Resolu-
tion 41/65).53
The first two treaties have been signed and ratified by the United
States, thus becoming binding obligations. Resolution 41/65, a
General Assembly resolution, is not legally binding. 4 However,
Resolution 41/65-" has been considered by many as a restatement of
the obligations enunciated by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the
Liability Convention, and it is regarded by some as a crystallization of
some customary international space norms.56
These treaties and principles draw the contours of commercial
remote sensing space activities and outline the United States' interna-
tional obligations and duties. However, these documents are not self-
executing; thus, they require domestic implementation of a regulatory
scheme that ensures compliance.5 7 In other words, domestic regula-
tions on space activities, whether commercial or governmental, must be
enacted and must conform to international law.
A. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Liability Convention
With its seventeen articles, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967
provides the international framework for the commercialization of
space.5" Concerned with the "exploration and use" of outer space, the
Treaty recognizes and emphasizes the need to use outer space for the
common interest of all mankind" and for the "benefit of all peoples
irrespective of the degree of their economic and scientific develop-
51. Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
52. Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention].
53. See supra note 7. For the resolution establishing the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS), see G.A. Res. 1472, 12 Dec. 1959.
54. See U.N. CHARTER, ch. IV, art. 10-11, reprinted in [1959] Y.B. 542-43.
55. Resolution 41/65 was adopted unanimously and without a formal vote. See 1959
U.N.Y.B. 24-28.
56. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 90-94 (1991)
[hereinafter CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW]; see Tatsuzawa supra note 45, at 23.
57. See Fred Kosmo, Note, The Commercialization of Space: A Regulatory Scheme that
Promotes Commercial Ventures and International Responsibility, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1065
(1988); see also CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56, at 368-69.
58. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 51, at 2410-21.
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ment."' 9 The first five articles stress the importance of the use and
exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes, reject national
appropriation claims on outer space, and invite cooperation and
understanding in accordance with international law and the United
Nations Charter.6 °
Articles VI and IX are the most relevant to private commercial
activities in space. Article VI states:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for
national activities in outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by govern-
mental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring
that national activities are carried out in conformity with provisions
set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental
entities in outer space ... shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty .... 61
Thus, Article VI is relevant, first, because it imposes on the United
States an international responsibility for activities, including remote
sensing, undertaken by private entities. It also imposes a duty on
the United States to establish a regulatory scheme that ensures national
supervision of the activities to be carried out in conformity with
international legal norms.63
Second, Articles VI and IX, through their references to "non-
governmental entities" and "nationals," recognize, at least implicitly,
the right of private entities to participate in the use and exploration of
outer space."4 The recognized right to participate coupled with the
international responsibility clause was the result of a compromise
between the Soviet Union, which believed that private entities should
be banned from conducting space activities, and Western states, which
59. Id. at 2411.
60. See id. at 2412-14.
61. Id. at 2415.
62. See id. The concept of international responsibility refers to duties of states toward each
other in relation to international and transboundary events, such as space activities. CHRISTOL,
SPACE LAW, supra note 56, at 240. For example, a collision between two satellites would invoke
international responsibility. Id.
63. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 51, at 2415.
64. See id. at 2415-17 (Articles VI and IX); see also Roger K. Hoover, Law and Security in
Outer Space from the Viewpoint of Private Industry, 11 J. SPACE L. 115, 116-17 (1983). Article
IX states in part: "If a State Party to the Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or
experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer space ... would cause potentially harmful
interference with activities of other States Parties. . . , it shall undertake appropriate international
consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment." Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 51, at 2416-17.
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advocated the right of private entities to conduct commercial ventures
in space.6"
The concept of international responsibility enunciated in the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 was reaffirmed in the Liability Conven-
tion. Under the Convention, the launching nation is absolutely liable
for damage caused on the surface of the Earth. 66 It is important to
note that a claim cannot be brought by a private entity or a citizen of
another nation; the Convention gives only nations the right and the
power to bring an action against the nation causing the damage.67
The Liability Convention covers damages resulting from the "loss of
life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage
to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical."6
Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Liability
Convention do not specifically deal with remote sensing, they formed
the basis upon which the principles of Resolution 41/65 were enacted.
More importantly, they established the international legal framework
for the United States to follow and implement.
B. Resolution 41/65
It took COPUOS almost seventeen years to reach a consensus
among nations on the principles governing remote sensing. 69 Al-
though the issue of remote sensing was first raised at the First United
Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Vienna in
1968,70 the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS did not start formulat-
ing the rules governing remote sensing until Argentina submitted a
formal draft proposal on the rules in 1970."' The goal of COPUOS
was to reach a binding treaty on remote sensing." However, the
document agreed upon was submitted to the General Assembly to be
voted on as a non-binding resolution in 1986. 73
65. NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
72 (1988).
66. Liability Convention, supra note 52, at 2392-93 (Articles II and IV). A launching state
is defined, in Article I (c)(ii), as "[a] State from whose territory or facility a space object is
launched." Id. at 2392.
67. See id. at 2395 (Articles VII and VIII). A claim for damages will be resolved through
diplomatic channels or the courts of the state liable for the damages or, if the dispute cannot be
resolved through those channels, through the International Court of Justice. Id.
68. Id. at 2392 (Article I).
69. DeSaussure, supra note 29, at 356 (Part I).
70. Id. at 354.
71. Id.
72. See Weaver, supra note 27, at 35.
73. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 55.
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The clash between sovereign rights and freedom of outer space
presented major disagreements and disputes that hampered the
progress of formulating remote sensing guidelines. The problems
revolved around two major issues: (1) the necessity of prior consent
or consultation, and (2) the right to access and disseminate remote
sensing data.74  Many lesser developed countries, especially Latin
American nations, argued that because they have permanent sovereign-
ty over their natural wealth and resources, they also have a sovereign
right to information concerning those resources. 7' Hence, they argued
that before any data or information can be collected through remote
sensing, they have a right to be consulted and a right to either grant or
deny approval.76 The United States opposed these views and argued
that the Outer Space Treaty, especially Article I, and customary
international practice establish the freedom of space and support the
policy of "open skies" long advocated by the United States.77
The United States advocated the position that any limitations on
the right to acquire and disseminate data would be a violation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides for the
freedom to "seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media . . regardless of frontiers. ''78 Therefore, the right of the"sensed state" to obtain priority access to data generated in its
territories and the right to have a final decision regarding the dissemi-
nation of the data to a third party were focal issues long disputed and
argued.9
In the midst of these disputes, Resolution 41/65 emerged,
reaffirming the right of non-governmental entities to participate in
space activities and the obligation of nations to authorize and supervise
74. DeSaussure, supra note 29, at 354-55; see also CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56,
at 76-83.
75. See CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56, at 75; see also Aldo A. Cocca, Remote
Sensing of Natural Resources by Means of Space Technology: A Latin American Point of View, in
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE 63, 63-68 (Nicholas M.
Matte & Hamilton DeSaussure eds., 1976). These resources include minerals, forests, water
resources, and other natural resources.
76. See The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Treaty on Remote Sensing of
Natural Resources by Means of Space Technology, U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 29th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 32, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/1047 (1974).
77. See DeSaussure, supra note 29, at 355; see also CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 732-35 (1982).
78. Hayward, supra note 8, at 173 (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217A
(III), 3(1) U.N. GAOR Reg. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)).
79. DeSaussure, supra note 29, at 355.
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their citizens in outer space.8" The relevance of Resolution 41/65 lies
in its consensual nature and its specific focus on remote sensing. It
does not solve all the problems or create a perfect certainty for
commercial entities; however, it does set up non-binding guidelines for
nations to follow on both international and domestic levels.
Resolution 41/65 emphasizes the concept of cooperation as a
compromise between claims of national sovereignty and total free-
dom.81 Resolution 41/65 also reaffirms the concept of freedom of
exploration and use, rejects the prior consent and priority of access
proposals, and stresses the duty to undergo remote sensing activities in
compliance with international law, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,
and the Liability Convention.82 Articles IX and XIV impose on
nations the duty to comply with the principles and obligations of
international law, while maintaining the concept of international
responsibility enunciated in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.83 It is
important to note that under the Resolution, sensed nations have the
right to some remote sensing data on a "non-discriminatory basis and
on reasonable cost terms."8
C. Customs and Relevant Practices
There is no question that nations have the right to engage in
remote sensing activities. If this right is not sufficiently emphasized
in treaty law and international instruments, it definitely finds support
in customary international law.8" The practice of nations regarding
remote sensing activities reflects a widespread acceptance of freedom
of space and the right to collect data. This practice is evidenced by the
increasing number of governmental and non-governmental remote
sensing ventures and the increased sales of collected data. 6
Meanwhile, there are several treaties and practices not dealing
directly with remote sensing and the sale of imagery that nonetheless
impact the policies and rules behind the commercialization of remote
sensing imagery. One of those instruments is the "Open Skies"
80. Principles, supra note 7, at 453, 455 (Principles IV and XIV) (referring to "entities"
under the jurisdiction of states, i.e. non-governmental organizations).
81. Carl Q. Christol, Introductory Note, United Nations: Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space Draft Principles on Remote Sensing, 25 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1331, 1331-33
(1986).
82. Id. at 1332-33; see Principles, supra note 7, at 453 (Principles III and IV).
83. Principles, supra note 7, at 454-55.
84. Id. at 454 (Principle XII).
85. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 1990)
(discussing customary international law).
86. See supra section II.C.
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Treaty, ratified by the Senate in 1993, which empowers the signatory
nations, "regardless of their size, wealth, or level of technology-to
acquire through aerial or spatial activities meaningful security
information. '8 7 The Open Skies Treaty also adopted the principle of
full territorial openness, which includes territory formerly restricted for
national security reasons.88 Such a treaty, although not oriented
toward remote sensing, might play a significant and helpful role in
determining the level of scrutiny private actors might be subjected to
when applying for a license for the sale of remote sensing imagery and
systems.
Furthermore, the United States strongly advocates the concept of
nondiscriminatory access to remote sensing data. The United States
policy on open dissemination of data pre-dates the launching of private
remote sensing satellites.8 9 The government made the data originated
by LANDSAT available to the public, absent national security or
public safety concerns.9" This concept was promoted by the United
States on the international level; in all relevant international organiza-
tions, including Resolution 41/65; and in all its agreements with other
countries regarding remote sensing.9 The United States incorporated
this requirement domestically in its regulatory scheme, making it an
essential requirement for granting licenses to private operators.92
There is no question that concerns over national security and
national sovereignty persist on the international level. However, the
principles of open skies, free dissemination of data, and the concept of
space as an arena for all humankind have triumphed over nationalistic
aspirations. In light of these international obligations, the United
States had to create a regulatory scheme to enable it to honor its
international obligations domestically and promote its domestic goals
internationally.
87. Marian Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law,
88 AM. J. INT'L L. 89, 98 (1994). The Open Skies Treaty was submitted to the Senate by
President George Bush in 1992. Id. at 96.
88. Id. at 98.
89. See Eilene Galloway, Remote Sensing from Outer Space: Legal Implications of Worldwide
Utilization and Dissemination of Data, in LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM
OUTER SPACE 91, 91-97 (Nicholas M. Matte & Hamilton DeSaussure eds., 1976).
90. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 15 U.S.C.A. § 5651(a) (West Supp. 1995);
see Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-365, 98 Stat. 451
(codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4201-4292 (West Supp. 1995)), repealed by Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 4, 106 Stat. 4166.
91. Paul F. Uhlir, Esq., The Public International Law of Civilian Remote Sensing: An
Overview, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF SPACE 25,
58 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq., ed., 1986).
92. 15 C.F.R. § 960.1 (1995).
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IV. DOMESTIC LAWS AND POLICIES
In light of these international obligations, nations, in order to
assure the success of manned and unmanned space activities, have
generally adopted suitable standards in the form of legislation,
administrative orders, and decrees. 3 Many countries such as Russia,
France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and Canada have
implemented policies in the last decade that will enable them to meet
their international legal obligations, while at the same time allow them
to support the efforts of their national remote sensing industries. 4 In
the United States, international obligations in the area of commercial
remote sensing activities were recognized through a licensing and
regulatory scheme that included major national security safeguards.
Legislation and regulations adopted include: The Land Remote
Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984," s the NOAA's administrative
regulations in 1987,96 the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of
1992, 97 and, most recently, the Clinton Administration's 1994 policy
on remote sensing space capabilities.98 In addition, several Presiden-
tial directives dealing with national space policy and the commercializa-
tion process were announced. 9 The creation of these legal schemes
clearly signaled that the United States was committed to promoting the
commercialization of space and emphasizing the role of private actors
in the development of space technologies.
A. The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 and the
NOAA 's Administrative Regulations
The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 was a
major step in the progress toward the commercialization of remote
sensing imagery. It was also the culmination of several years of
93. See, e.g., Michel Bourly, Quelques Reflexions au Sujet des Ligislations Spatiales
Nationales, 16 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 245 (1991).
94. Stephen Gorove, Sources and Principles of Space Law, in SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT
AND SCOPE 45, 53-54 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1992); see HARR & KOHLI, supra note 25,
at 35-63 (discussing France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany); Gupta, supra note 37,
at 98-100 (discussing France and Russia).
95. Pub. L. No. 98-365, 98 Stat. 451 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4201-4292 (West Supp.
1995)), repealed by Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 4, 106 Stat.
4166.
96. 15 C.F.R. § 960 (1996).
97. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 5651-5672 (West Supp. 1995).
98. See Policy Release, supra note 1.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 101-105.
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commitment to bring the private sector into the outer space arena.100
The commercialization of space was a prime goal during the Carter
Administration, as demonstrated by its Directive on National Space
Policy and the assignment of LANDSAT's operations to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the Department
of Commerce. 0 1 Under pressure from the intelligence community,
President Carter restricted the resolution capabilities of remote sensing
systems to 10-meter.102 During the Reagan Administration, howev-
er, the process of commercialization picked up steam. President
Reagan announced his commitment to expand private sector invest-
ment and involvement in space activities" 3 and to commercialize
LANDSAT. °4 Furthermore, a 1982 statute directed the Secretary
of Commerce to "plan for the transfer of the ownership and operation
of civil operational land remote sensing satellite systems to the private
sector when in the national interest."105
Congress got in the game by enacting the Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act of 1984 (1984 Act). The 1984 Act was aimed
at transferring responsibility of LANDSAT 4 and subsequent systems
from the NOAA to the private sector. 106 The significance of the
1984 Act lies in the way it deals with the selling and marketing of the
imagery produced by LANDSAT and its provisions on licensing
procedures and rules. 107 The 1984 Act puts the responsibility of
running and licensing private remote sensing systems in the hands of
the Secretary of Commerce, who by statute must consult with the
100. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56, at 3570.
101. See White House Press Release (Declaration of a Presidential Directive on National
Space Policy) (June 20, 1978), in SPACE LAW: SELECTED BASIC DOCUMENTS 558 (Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation ed., 2d ed. 1978); The White House Fact Sheet: U.S.
Civil Space Policy (Oct. 11, 1978), in SPACE LAW: SELECTED BASIC DOCUMENTS 561
(Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation ed., 2d ed. 1978). For a further explana-
tion on the policy and directives, see President's Announcement of Administration Review, 1
PUB. PAPERS 1135-37 (June 20, 1978).
102. See Tony Mauro, The Puzzling Problems of Pictures from Space, WASH. JOURNALISM
REV., June 1986, at 15, 17.
103. See Fact Sheet Outlining United States Space Policy, 2 PUB. PAPERS 895 (July 4,
1982).
104. See TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, at 6.
105. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
324, § 201(a), 96 Stat. 1597, 1601 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1517 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995)).
106. Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-365, §§ 102,
103, 202, 98 Stat. 451 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4201-4292 (West Supp. 1995)), repealed by
Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-555, § 4, 106 Stat. 4166.
107. Id. §§ 202, 302.
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Secretary of Defense on national security matters and with the
Secretary of State on matters involving international obligations."°
Following the 1984 Act, the NOAA held hearings to determine
how the government should license private remote sensing systems.109
Although the transfer of LANDSAT to a private venture, EOSAT,
faced some problems,"' the NOAA continued the process of pro-
mulgating regulations on how and under what conditions a license can
be granted as provided for under Title IV of the 1984 Act."'
National security, as in previous directives and policies, remained the
most important goal and objective of the regulations." 2 Despite this
emphasis, however, the regulations were intended to favor commercial-
ization and encourage nondiscriminatory access to data."' The
regulations provide (1) pre-application consultation procedures for
applicants in order to reveal design or data collection requirements and
avoid costly changes, "' and (2) the possibility of a formal hearing if
a license application is denied." 5
While the 1984 Act and its associated regulations raised the hopes
of private actors, the directives and policies of the late 1980s gave
national security a renewed emphasis. Such an emphasis was clearly
manifested in a Presidential directive in 1988.116 Although the 1988
directive lifted the 10-meter resolution restriction, it put the private
sector in an uncertain position regarding when and how the national
security safeguards included in the 1984 Act and the associated
regulations would be invoked." 7 The directive, however, allowed
private entities to acquire imagery having a resolution of less than 10-
meter capability.
The liberalization process continued. "During the Bush Adminis-
tration, the possibility of allowing one-meter commercial systems was
raised but 'ran into a brick wall' thrown by the Central Intelligence
108. Id. § 607.
109. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56, at 360 (citing 3 Space Policy 355, No. 4 (Nov.
1987)).
110. The problems revolved mainly around funding and the proper procedural transition.
See CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56, at 360-64; Hayward, supra note 8, at 167.
111. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 960.4-12 (1995).
112. See id. § 960.1(a).
113. Id. § 960.1(b)-(c).
114. Id. § 960.4.
115. Id. § 960.10.
116. White House Fact Sheets Outlining Administration's Commercial Space Initiative and
President's Directive on National Space Policy, 49 FED. CONT. REP. 282, 286-87 (1988).
117. Seay, supra note 10, at 247-48.
[Vol. 19:539
Remote Sensing Imagery
Agency." ' 8 However, the Bush Administration managed to license
one 3-meter resolution system for WorldView Imaging Corporation
just before President Bush left office in January 1993.9
B. The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992
Although the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (1992 Act)
stresses the importance of national security interests and concerns, it
goes further in the process of commercialization than its predecessor,
the 1984 Act. The 1992 Act focuses on market considerations and the
promotion of private investment. 121 It reveals a shift in the main
focus of remote sensing policy from national security concerns to the
support of investments in remote sensing technology.121  The
purposes of the 1992 Act include: "removing unnecessary restrictions
on the dissemination of privately gathered data; streamlining of the
licensing process for private remote sensing systems; and encouraging
growth of the market for remote sensing data."' 22 The 1992 Act sets
out in great detail the licensing process 123 and the conditions for
operation of privately-owned remote sensing systems. 24  However,
its strongest contribution is that it shifts decisionmaking power to the
Secretary of Commerce and away from the Departments of Defense
and State. 21
Under the 1992 Act, national security safeguards and other
regulatory restrictions on private remote sensing satellite systems are
loosened to a certain extent by excluding resolution restrictions and
shifting responsibilities away from the military establishment. 26 The
private sector reacted well to the 1992 Act. After its passage, the
118. Joseph C. Anselmo, High Resolution Systems Promise Revolution in TV News,
AEROSPACE DAILY, Nov. 28, 1994, at 286.
119. See Don Clark, Spy Satellites Go Commercial, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 9,1993,
at Di.
120. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 5601 (West Supp. 1995); see also Statement on Signing the Land
Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2182 (Oct. 28, 1992)
[hereinafter Signing Statement 1992].
121. See Signing Statement 1992, supra note 120, at 2182.
122. Id.
123. 15 U.S.C.A. § 5621 (West Supp. 1995).
124. Id. §§ 5611, 5621-5622.
125. Id. §§ 5602, 5611, 5657; see also The Aeronautics and Space Policy Act of 1994, S. Res.
14222, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Tit. III, § 301(1)-(3) (1994) (pending signature of the President)
(aimed at revising and amending the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 with respect to
management and licensing of remote-sensing systems).
126. See George Brown, Commercial Remote Sensing Policy, CONG. PRESS RELEASE (Comm.
on Science, Space & Technology, U.S. House of Representatives), Mar. 10, 1994, at 1.
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NOAA received five license applications to operate private remote
sensing space systems. 127
C. The Clinton Administration's 1994 Policy on Remote
Sensing Space Capabilities
In March 1994, the Clinton Administration announced its policy
to allow expanded sales of images from space and exportation of
remote sensing systems (1994 policy).128 This policy gives United
States companies more freedom to sell satellite imagery on the
international market.129 The significance of the 1994 policy lies in
its acknowledgment of the relationship between national security goals
and long term economic stability and security.130
"The fundamental goal of [the] policy is to support and to
enhance US industrial competitiveness in the field of remote sensing
.. .while at the same time protecting US national security and foreign
policy interests."13' Under the 1994 policy, companies must obtain
a license from the Secretary of Commerce to operate remote sensing
systems and sell those images to domestic and foreign entities. 2
The NOAA, under the supervision and authorization of the Secretary
of Commerce, issues licenses and provides support so the Secretary can
respond to applications within 120 days. 33 Similarly, the export of
remote sensing systems is considered on a case-by-case basis, and the
export of sensitive technologies is reviewed on a restricted basis. 34
These operating licenses were not intended to replace the export license
required by the State Department and restricted by the United States
Munitions List, or the radio frequency license issued by the FCC.1 31
127. Commercial Remote Sensing in the Post-Cold War Era: Joint Hearing Before the Comm.
on Science, Space and Technology and the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess., 43-44 (1994) (testimony of Dr. James Baker, Under-Secretary NOAA); see also Foley, supra
note 34, at 22.
128. See Policy Release, supra note 1, at 1.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1.
132. Id. at 1-2.
133. 15 U.S.C.A. § 5621(a) & (c) (West Supp. 1995).
134. Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 3.
135. See id. at 1; see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 5621(b), 5656(a) (West Supp. 1995); The United
States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 121.1, category XV(b), 122.1, 122.2 (1995) (indicating
that the State Department retains the power to issue licenses for the export of remote sensing
satellites); Export Administration Regulations Commodity Control List, 15 C.F.R. § 799.1
(9A04A) (1995) (listing items regulated by the Department of Commerce); Commercial Remote
Sensing in the Post-Cold War Era: Joint Hearing Before the Comm. on Science, Space and
Technology and the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1994)
(testimony of Dr. Scott Pace, Critical Technologies Institute, RAND Corp.) [hereinafter
[Vol. 19:539
Remote Sensing Imagery
Instead, the 1994 policy indicates that the Department of Commerce
will operate with the "presumption that remote sensing space systems
whose performance capabilities and imagery quality characteristics are
available or are planned for availability in the world marketplace (e.g.,
SPOT, LANDSAT, etc.) will be favorably considered."'36
1. National Security Restrictions
The 1994 policy provides for specific conditions to be included in
the license in order to protect national security interests and interna-
tional obligations.' However, the policy itself reflects the intelli-
gence community's lift of the blanket opposition to the release of
space-based data.138 Although such opposition was lifted and the
policy supposedly "unleashes"' 39 for United States companies the
potential for using "21st century information technology,"'' 40 major
national security safeguards remain.
The 1994 policy "leaves room for the Government to shut down
a satellite system during . . . 'periods when national security or
international obligations and/or foreign policies may be compro-
mised."'"' This restriction is known as the "Shutter Clause." It
requires the licensee to use "a data downlink format that allows the US
Government access and use of the data during periods when national
security, international obligations and/or foreign policy may be
compromised.' 14 2 The 1994 policy also requires the following:
During periods when national security or international obligations
and/or foreign policies may be compromised, as defined by the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State, respectively, the
Secretary of Commerce may, after consultation with the appropriate
agency(ies), require the licensee to limit data collection and/or
distribution by the system to the extent necessitated by the given
situation. Decisions to impose such limits only will be made by the
Testimony of Dr. Pace].
136. Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
137. Policy Release, supra note 1, at 2.
138. See Commercial Remote Sensing in the Post-Cold War Era: Joint Hearing Before the
Comm. on Science, Space and Technology and the Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1994) (statements of James Woolsey, Director, CIA) [hereinafter Statements
of Woolsey]; see also Few Details Revealed on Satellite Imagery Export Policy; Policy, Export
Licenses Expected Within Months, DEF. DAILY, Nov. 18, 1993, at 251.
139. Policy Release, supra note 1, at 1.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 5; see also Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. to Allow Sale of the Technology for Spy
Satellites, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1994, at Al (emphasis added).
142. Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 2 (emphasis added).
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Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Secretary of Defense
or the Secretary of State, as appropriate. Disagreements between
Cabinet Secretaries may be appealed to the President....
Pursuant to the Act, the US Government requires US companies
that have been issued operating licenses under the Act to notify the
US Government of its intent to enter into significant or substantial
agreements with new foreign customers. Interested agencies shall be
given advance notice of such agreements to allow them the opportu-
nity to review the proposed agreement in light of the national
security, international obligations and foreign policy concerns of the
US Government)43
These national security safeguards were implemented in order to
satisfy the intelligence and military communities who feared an all-out
hands-off commercialization policy.'44 Other conditions include the
following: (1) the licensee must maintain a record of the satellite
operations for the previous twelve months and allow the government
access to that record; (2) the licensee may not change the operational
characteristics of the satellite system without notifying and receiving
approval from the Department of Commerce; (3) the government must
approve the encryption devices in remote sensing systems for the
purpose of denying unauthorized access to data; and (4) the license is
valid for a limited time and is not transferable or subject to foreign
ownership, above a certain threshold, without the permission of the
Department of Commerce. 145
The term "national security" is not defined or clarified anywhere
in the acts, regulations, or policy. While the emphasis on "national
security" remains, the scope and context of the term are ambiguous
and uncertain. This ambiguity might very well serve the goals of the
intelligence community, a community that prefers a flexible and easily
adaptable term. However, it provides great uncertainty and risk for
private ventures, which are already taking great risks by venturing into
space.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. See Statements of Woolsey, supra note 138, at 22; John Mintz, Whose Are the Eyes
That Spy?; the CIA Could Do Business or Battle Over Satellite Photos, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1994,
at D1; Jones & Walter, National Security, Technology Transfer Control and U.S. Space Policy, in
INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLICY 67-68 (Papp & McIntyre eds., 1986).




V. NATIONAL SECURITY SAFEGUARDS:
PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS
The primary object behind the national security safeguards is to
prevent the disclosure of images of the United States or other vital sites
from which intelligence information can be extracted by foreign
intelligence agencies.146 However, private operators of remote
sensing systems look upon the 1994 policy and the regulations to
provide them with an economic environment that will enable them to
compete effectively on the international market and help them maintain
their technological and economic leadership in the area of high-
resolution imagery. 147  Both of these concerns and objectives are
legitimate and should be given important consideration, and the 1994
policy attempts to strike a balance between these two goals. However,
the national security safeguards included in the regulations and the
1994 policy fail to meet both of these objectives in two ways. First,
they inject uncertainty and legal risk in private ventures. Second, they
fail to provide the security sought by the intelligence community.
Under the existing domestic legal regime, the degree of certainty
and predictability essential for commercial development is missing.
Concerns exist over the lack of a clear legal standard regarding when
and how these national security safeguards will be invoked. Addition-
ally, uncertainty is created by the lack of a clear definition of the term"national security" and the complex maze of inter-agency consultations
during the process of licensing. 148  Before proceeding further in
examining these sources of uncertainties, it is essential to focus on and
understand the position of the intelligence community vis-A-vis the
commercialization of remote sensing imagery.
A. National Security Restrictions and the Intelligence Community
For a long time there has been a division between military
reconnaissance and commercial remote sensing systems in terms of
technological developments and capabilities. As civilian systems
advance technologically and their resolution power increases, the
division is "melting away,"' 4 9 leaving a serious conflict between the
146. See GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 184 (1989).
147. See Testimony of Frey, supra note 3, at 10-12; Statement of Araki, supra note 40, at
10-15.
148. See Testimony of Dr. Pace, supra note 135, at 90, 94.
149. DeSaussure, supra note 29, at 373.
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intelligence community and commercial ventures. The intelligence
community insists that the sale of high-resolution remote sensing
imagery poses a threat because it will increase the vulnerability of
United States forces by increasing costs, reducing the effectiveness of
military operations, and causing higher casualties.' ° Space-based
imagery might provide valuable intelligence information to countries
lacking their own reconnaissance satellites; it will help disseminate
information regarding United States military operations, thereby
depriving United States troops of the critical tactical element of
surprise; and finally, it will deprive the military of control during a
time of crisis.' By monitoring and exposing military build up and
disposition of forces, remote sensing hinders the execution of conven-
tional first strikes and might very well trigger a premature armed
conflict if the data is misread and misapplied. 2
For decades, the intelligence community used two principal tools
to protect its intelligence secrets and methods: (1) spatial resolution
limitations, and (2) access to data." 3 The intelligence community,
through its active role in the licensing process, forced limits on
technology and design criteria embodied in civilian remote sensing
systems. ' 4 Until recently, the intelligence community showed great
resistance to resolutions of less than 10-meter capability because of
"national security concerns."'55  Such a resolution limitation was
considerable in light of the knowledge that the Department of Defense
and the Central Intelligence Agency operate systems with 0.1-meter
resolution capability."6 With such a resolution limitation, the
intelligence community can restrict the clarity of images and make any
interpretation problematic. Limitations on access to data were the
primary tools used by the intelligence community which, through the
participation of the Department of Defense in the licensing process,
keeps a close eye on who is getting access to data and for what
150. Foley, supra note 34, at 22.
151. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, COMMERCIAL
NEWSGATHERING FROM SPACE - A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 30-32 (1987) (hereinafter
COMMERCIAL NEWSGATHERING].
152. Gupta, supra note 37, at 113.
153. Frederick B. Henderson III., Private Sector Satellite Remote Sensing: Barriers to
Commercialization, in 2 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, THE LAW, AND THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
SPACE 79, 102-05 (Phillip D. Mink, Esq., ed., 1986).
154. See TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, at 95. These limitations were
implemented in the U.S. Policies and Regulations. See CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW, supra note 56,
at 363; Seay, supra note 10, at 245.
155. Henderson, supra note 153, at 103.
156. See Foley, supra note 34, at 22.
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purpose. I"7 Some of the conditions in the Clinton Administration's
1994 policy embody such limitations, although the extent of their
applicability remains to be tested.'
B. Lack of a Legal Standard and Uncertainty in the Procedures
The arguments made by the intelligence community are valid and
should not be discarded. However, they fail to recognize the economic
realities of the post-Cold War world. The intelligence community's
concerns arose when the United States was one of the very few players
in the arena of remote sensing imagery. Now that other players have
entered the picture, however, the values and safeguards should change
to give United States companies the opportunity to compete on equal
footing with foreign companies and governments. There is no question
that the tension between the intelligence community and the business
community has eased and national security safeguards have substantial-
ly receded.' 59 However, questions of when and how these safeguards
will be invoked remain. 160 Because of the political nature of the term"national security," its definition and scope vary with the changing
policies of the administration in power.
In other legal contexts, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 19786 and the Freedom of Information Act, 62 the
question of the scope of the term "national security" has caused great
confusion. 63  The confusion is attributed to the complexity of the
standard, the failure of Congress to formulate clear legislation, and the
157. Henderson, supra note 153, at 104; see also TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, supra note
45, at 95.
158. It is important to note that the use of high-resolution imagery is seen by some as a
stabilizing factor on the international level by "calming overblown fears" and reducing the fears
of surprise attacks. See Florini, supra note 12, at 112.
159. See supra section IV.
160. Nowhere in the Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, The Land
Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992, or the NOAA regulations and the 1994 policy is the term
"national security" defined. For example, when Anita Jones, the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering, was asked about what standard the Department of Defense will use to determine
when national security is threatened, she replied: "Let's see. That -... Let's see, I don't there
is - it is such a complex problem; there's not something so simple that is one standard that is
a recipe that tells you how to deal with each situation." Press Briefing with Deputy Secretary of
Defense John Deutch and Director of Defense Research and Engineering Anita Jones, FED. NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 5, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
161. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1829 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
162. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1996).
163. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (reviewing the term "national security" in the
context of the Freedom of Information Act); United States v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655, 658-59
(D. Md. 1985) (using the terms "national security" and "national defense" interchangeably in the
context of the Espionage Act).
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manner in which the executive branch has enforced and interpreted
it. 164
The use of the term "national security" in the 1984 and 1992 Acts
and in the 1994 policy has not gone unnoticed. Use of the term
without definition has been characterized as unconstitutionally vague
because it fails to give companies a clear standard on how and when
the safeguards will be applied to their systems. 165
However, the challenge will rarely survive the judicial deference
given to the executive branch in matters relating to national security
and foreign affairs, as courts, when faced with the issue of the
vagueness of the term "national security," have consistently held in
favor of the executive branch or the agency enforcing the statute
containing an undefined "national security" term. 166
The intradepartmental consultation provided for in the NOAA
regulations and the 1994 policy may add to this uncertainty because
each department will be responsible for promulgating its own standards
on when and how national security safeguards are to be applied. 167
Such additional procedures might delay the process and create
confusion as to whether a license should be granted or denied. In the
face of such uncertainty and confusion, the NOAA promised to
promulgate rules clarifying the process and relaxing the standards. 61
This uncertainty was manifested when Saudi Arabia, in conjunc-
tion with Litton Itek and GDE Systems, applied for a license to
operate a remote sensing system called Eyeglass. 169  The application
not only sparked a heated debate between the Department of Com-
merce and the Departments of Defense and State, but also triggered
congressional debate about the sale and its military implication for the
security of Israel, the United States' main ally in the Middle East. 7 '
164. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 350, 406 (1986).
165. Licensing of Private Remote-Sensing Space Systems, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,966 (1987); New
Remote Sensing Regulations May Better Explain Shutter Policy, AEROSPACE DAILY, May 8, 1995,
at 204.
166. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Dep't
of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Horizons Int'l, Inc. v. Baldrige, 811 F.2d 154
(3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Dedeyan, 584 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Morison,
604 F. Supp. 655 (D. Md. 1985).
167. See Fact Sheet, supra note 2, at 2.
168. Remote Sensing Industry Pushes for More Regulatory Relaxation, SATELLITE WEEK,
May 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
169. Steve Rodan, Space Wars, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 10, 1995, at 8.
170. See Philip Finnegan, Imagery Firms Fear Policy Shift; Congressional Flak Over Sale to
Saudis Threatens Industry, DEFENSE NEWS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 3.
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This example illustrates the uncertainty that United States companies
are faced with when venturing into the sale or import of high-
resolution imagery and remote sensing systems.
Companies are skeptical about how and when the political winds
might alter and reshape an unclear and ambiguous standard such as the
national security concept. Furthermore, the question in the minds of
United States and foreign corporate executives is whether they are
willing to invest a substantial amount of money-approximately $200
million in the case of Eyeglass-and take the risk of having their
license denied or revoked for political reasons. The question is
especially relevant when considering the number of foreign competitors
who are more than willing to enter into agreements with clients (such
as the Saudis) to build and operate a remote sensing system.
C. Attempts to Define National Security
Other areas of law might provide helpful insight on the scope and
breadth of the term "national security" in remote sensing regulation.
In the Export Administration Act,171 national security controls
restrict trade in any goods and technology that would enhance the
military power of a foreign nation to the detriment of United States
security.' From a military perspective, "national security" is
defined as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or
group of nations, or ... a favorable foreign relations position, or...
a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive
action from within or without, overt or covert." '
National security had to take a different twist in light of the
dramatic political, economic, and social changes that took place in the
world with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern block.
The changes forced United States administrations to reformulate their
concept of national security because military and economic security
became so intertwined so as to be inseparable. 174  The power of
nations depends not only on their military strength and readiness, but
also on the economic power of their private industries and the stability
171. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995). The purpose of the Act
is to minimize uncertainties in export control policy and to regulate exports while promoting U.S.
economic and political goals. Id. § 2402.
172. Id. § 2402(2)(A).
173. HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 262 n.23 (1990) (quoting Barnet, Rethinking National
Strategy, NEW YORKER, Mar. 21, 1988, at 107).
174. Ronald H. Brown, New Frontier in Space for U.S. Entrepreneurs, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Nov. 17, 1994, at B19.
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of their economies, both of which enable them to compete efficiently
and effectively in the international market.
For private industry, security can be defined as freedom to
conduct business in an environment free from "danger, fear, anxiety
and deprivation relating to its right to conduct business, its equipment,
its employees, its technology, and its profits."' 75  The ability to
operate in a stable and consistent legal, political, and economic
environment is an essential part of surviving and competing on
international and domestic levels.' 76 The success of private industry
will contribute to national security (broadly defined) by maintaining
the industrial base of the United States economy, encouraging
development in high-technology, and advancing the economy.
Economically speaking, the problem with the vagueness of the
term "national security" is whether the NOAA regulations and the
1994 policy can create an environment conducive to business ventures
and operation. The vagueness of the term "national security" injects
uncertainty in the private sector and fails to give companies with
remote sensing ventures the stability necessary to conduct such
expensive and risky operations.' 7 Prospective applicants for remote
sensing systems may want greater certainty as to when a license may
be granted and under what conditions the "Shutter Clause" might
apply to their systems.'78 However, such certainty would restrict the
power of the executive branch-a group that is interested in expanding
the matters deemed "national security concerns. 1' 79  Thus, the
dilemma that surfaces in the context of national security is whether we
should entrust to the President and the executive branch the task of
determining fluctuating national security interests in the area of remote
sensing imagery, thus tying it to current political sympathies and
antipathies, or whether we should define a clear standard and insist on
a clear statutory statement as the predicate for executive power.
There is no easy answer to this dilemma. However, in the face of
the development of advanced foreign systems, the application of a
vague and unpredictable standard will make it very difficult for
companies to compete efficiently in the world market. 8 ° Working
175. See Hoover, supra note 64, at 115.
176. See id. at 121-22.
1.77. See Testimony of Frey, supra note 3, at 8-9.
178. Anselmo, supra note 118.
179. Cf. Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 164, at 354. Edgar and Schmidt argue that the
Executive's power is at its peak when matters are characterized as "secret" and that vagueness will
allow the Executive to determine the parameters of what is permissible.
180. See TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 45, at 13.
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with such a vague standard will lead United States companies to raise
their prices in order to compensate for the lack of certainty, which will
inhibit the commercial development of their imagery and put them at
a disadvantage in the global market.
D. Lessons to Be Learned from the Export Control Regime
Studies conducted on the costs of export controls and other
"disincentives" reveal that United States companies lose up to $40
billion per year in lost sales abroad.' 8 ' For example, when the
United States imposed sanctions on the People's Republic of China and
Pakistan for the sale of Chinese missile components to Pakistan by
prohibiting the sales of satellites, satellite technology, and other related
equipment, the Chinese contracted with the Germans to purchase
twenty satellites.182 This Sino-German deal represented $2 billion in
lost sales for United States companies and jeopardized their chances of
securing future deals.' 3 To solve the problems and ease the bur-
dens, the Clinton Administration unveiled a new export policy aimed
at simplifying the export licensing process and allowing United States
companies to remain competitive on the international market.'84
Furthermore, in order to allow United States companies to
compete more effectively, the foreign availability regulations'85 were
enacted. Under the new export policy, the Secretary of Commerce is
empowered to grant licenses otherwise denied for national security
reasons when
the Secretary determines that an item is comparable in quality to an
item subject to U.S. national security export controls, and is
available-in-fact to a country, from a non-U.S. source, in sufficient
quantities to render the U.S. export control of that item or the
denial of an export license ineffective." 6
The two important lessons to be learned from this brief discussion
are: (1) restrictions on companies can have dramatic economic effects
on their competitiveness thereby eroding market share; and (2)
181. See, e.g., U.S. Export Controls, Other "Disincentives" Cost Firms $40 Billion a Year,
Study Says, INT'L TRADE REP., Sept. 29, 1993, at 1608, 1608 [hereinafter U.S. Export Controls].
182. Bradley K. Steinbrecher, Comment. The Impact of the Clinton Administration's Export
Promotion Plan on U.S. Exports of Computers and High-Technology Equipment, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 675, 688-89 (1995).
183. Simon Beck, Hughes Chief Blasts U.S. on China Trade Sanctions, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 21, 1993, at 14.
184. See U.S. Export Controls, supra note 181, at 1608.
185. 15 C.F.R. § 791 (1995).
186. Id. § 791.2(a).
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restrictions can be unnecessary and ineffective if the product restricted
is available from a non-United States source. These lessons are very
important for the sale of remote sensing imagery, not only in light of
the fierce competition and availability of similar imagery from other
non-United States sources, but also in light of the economic costs that
these national security restrictions might impose on United States
companies. This is especially relevant when these restrictions are
vague, untested, and their outcome uncertain. As one executive
commented, the "question for the future is not whether there will be
one-meter satellite imagery available commercially-it will hap-
pen-but rather will it be provided by U.S. companies or other foreign
sources. "187
The market reality is that imagery can be obtained from foreign
sources while United States companies are burdened with regulations
and policies that do not apply to these foreign entities.' The 1994
policy is set up so as to take foreign availability into consideration, but
there are no specific guidelines on how and when it will be consid-
ered."'
VI. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND NON-MARKET FACTORS
The changes in the supply side of remote sensing imagery was
prompted by a high demand for the product on national and interna-
tional levels. An efficient supplier, faced with a fertile market, will
strive to produce a better image with sharper resolution at a low price
so as to generate the most profit. 9 ' Thus, the price and the quality
of the imagery will be determined by market factors.' 9 ' However,
when non-market factors, such as government regulations and
unnecessary restrictions intervene, the market is distorted and
efficiency is decreased. 92
187. Statement of Araki, supra note 40, at 11 (quoting John McMahon, President, Lockheed
Missiles).
188. Licensing of Private Remote-Sensing Space Systems, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,967 (1987); see
also Kramer, supra note 10, at 364. An example of the government's difficulty in keeping imagery
away from the market occurred in Canada. The Canadian government had always gone to great
lengths to keep its top-secret base, known as Alert, away from the public eye. All this effort was
shattered when the Toronto Star published a satellite photo of the space station. The newspaper
obtained the photo from Sojuzkarta, the Soviet commercial remote sensing agency. Barry Brown,
Canadians Get Look at Secret Nato Base from Unlikely Source, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 28, 1989, at
A7.
189. See Policy Release, supra note 1, at 1.
190. George M. Cohen, Posnerian Jurisprudence and Economic Analysis of Law: The View
from the Bench, 133 U. PA. LA. REV. 1117, 1119 (1985).
191. Id. at 1121.
192. See, e.g., U.S. Export Controls, supra note 181, at 1608.
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Associated with every private remote sensing venture are costs and
risks that private entities have to deal with and absorb. Remote
sensing operators, like many other high-technology developers, have a
high entry cost into the market that requires high financial invest-
ment.'93 Additionally, such investments require years to amortize
and need a stable market for "technological continuity and orderly
investment recovery."'19 4  The cost associated with obtaining the
imagery depends on the resolution used, the technical characteristics of
the data, and other performance parameters such as altitude, cruising
speed, frequency of flights, and cost of operation.' These costs will
determine the cost per unit, absent any other factors, such as legal
uncertainty, for which the operator has provided in the form of higher
prices. Thus, the decision to invest in remote sensing imagery and
technology will depend not only on operation and technical costs, but
also on the degree of government involvement because private
operators should be able to guarantee service to future users for an
extended period of time in a consistent manner. 196
The remote sensing imagery market is projected to grow
tremendously by the turn of the century. 97 The demand for remote
sensing imagery is high, and United States companies are competing
among themselves and with foreign competitors to produce better
quality, lower-priced imagery to satisfy the market. Although the 1994
policy intends to eliminate non-market factors, it forces United States
companies to react to the competition rather than surpass it.
193. Stephen Doyle, Legal Aspects of Space Commercialization, in SPACE LAW:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 127, 133 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1992); Robert T. Deacon et
al., Optimizing the Time Stream Benefits from State and Local Government Use of LANDSAT Data:
An Application of Demand Revealing Process, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE
ON THE ECONOMICS OF REMOTE SENSING 133, 136 K.B. Craib & T.H. Watkins eds., (1978).
194. Doyle, supra note 193, at 133.
195. R.T. TSUCHIGANE & K.I. CHEN, Economics of Remote Sensing: An Alternative
Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND CONFERENCE ON THE ECONOMICS OF REMOTE
SENSING 98, 99 K.B. Craib & T.H. Watkins eds., (1978).
196. HARR & KOHLI, supra note 25, at 23.
197. Id. at 26.
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VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND EXISTING SAFEGUARDS
A. Defining National Security
The promise of the Clinton Administration's 1994 policy on
remote sensing space capabilities and of the Land Remote Sensing
Policy Act of 1992 might be hollow in the absence of a clear standard
on the subject of national security. If the 1992 Act is not amended to
reflect a clear standard, the current administration must adopt its own
standard that takes into account economic realities. If the intent of the
United States is to allow its companies to compete efficiently in the
global market, a narrow definition of national security should be
adopted. While national security concerns should be read narrowly in
the 1992 Act and in the 1994 policy, decisionmakers, whether the
Secretary of Commerce or Defense, should consider economic stability
and certainty an integral part of the nation's national security
goals."' Such a goal can be achieved by integrating a stronger
presumption in favor of the applicant regardless of whether or not the
technology and resolution capability are available in the market.
B. Alternative Remedies for Improper Conduct
The government has means of restricting the improper use of
remote sensing imagery other than the restrictions imposed through the
1992 Act and the 1994 policy. Many federal laws impose criminal
sanctions against improper use of remote sensing imagery. The federal
espionage statutes, 199 for example, prohibit gathering and disseminat-
ing defense information,2"0 photographing defense installations, 20 1
and gathering and delivering defense information to foreign govern-
ments. °2 These statutes and other export control regulations, such
as the Munitions List restrictions,0 3 provide a sufficient deterrent to
companies and will protect United States national security interests to
the extent possible. The statutes are applicable to remote sensing and
can be effective.20 4 Further, national security safeguards exist in the
export statutes and regulations-they provide the same national
security protection that the 1994 policy on remote sensing intends to
198. Brown, supra note 174, at B19; see also Hoover, supra note 64, at 121-22.
199. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 792-799 (West 1976 & Supp. 1995).
200. Id. § 793.
201. Id. § 795.
202. Id. § 794.
203. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1995).
204. See COMMERCIAL NEWSGATHERING, supra note 151, at 47-48.
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provide."' In addition to these protections, during times of crisis,
the Trading with the Enemy Act. 6 provides for many of the safe-
guards included in the 1994 policy so as to make many of the
restrictions redundant and unnecessary.20 7
C. International Forum: A Multilateral Solution
There are two ways the United States can restrict and monitor the
sale of remote sensing imagery. First, the United States can exercise
unilateral control over United States companies by implementing
restrictions binding on United States companies only. Second, the
United States can adopt a multilateral and international approach in
which nations agree on a system similar to the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons systems-a system that will be monitored by an
institutionalized agency set up to monitor compliance with international
obligations.
There is no question that the United States has an international
obligation to supervise and authorize its nationals in space. However,
the effectiveness of unilateral national security safeguards is question-
able at best. The use of such safeguards would force United States
companies to compete on a different level with foreign companies, thus
putting them at a disadvantage. If these restrictions are needed and
the sale of remote sensing imagery should be regulated, a multilateral
treaty might provide a better solution by placing all players on equal
footing. With few players currently in the game, it may be possible to
achieve a consensus and establish common interests and grounds to
prevent national security threats to all parties to that treaty. Nations
will have incentives to participate in such a multinational treaty
because a treaty will put them on an equal level with other nations and
might provide the forum in which security concerns and data access
needs can be balanced and satisfied.
205. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 category XV (1995) (restricting the export of remote sensing satellite
systems).
206. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1-6, 7-39, 41-44 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995).
207. Id. §§ 2-6.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the 1992 Act and the 1994 policy fulfill
the United States' international obligations of authorization, supervi-
sion, and open dissemination. 2"8  However, the 1994 policy poses a
major challenge with regard to national security issues. With the
intensification of foreign competition, the expansion of the remote
sensing imagery market, and the open skies policy adopted by the
United States and a substantial number of nations, very few secrets
remain. It is probably futile for the United States government to
thwart the sale of imagery by United States companies, especially when
similar imagery can be obtained from foreign sources over which the
government has no control.20 9 The security of the United States lies
not only in its military stability, but also in its economic and commer-
cial success and well-being.210
208. See supra section III.A.
209. See Kramer, supra note 10, at 364 (arguing the futility of preventing publication of
remote sensing imagery in news media).
210. The NOAA is considering revisions to its regulations for the licensing of private
remote sensing space systems and has solicited public comments. Specifically, the NOAA
solicited comments regarding the standards applicable to national security restrictions. Licensing
of Private Remote-Sensing Space Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,054 (1995) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. § 960).
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